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Abstract
In laboratory experiments, we compare the ability of
trigger strategies with that of (relatively complex)
review strategies to coordinate capacity decisions in
supply chains when demand forecasts are based on
private information. While trigger strategies punish
apparently uncooperative behavior (misstated demand
forecasts) immediately, review strategies only punish
when apparently misstated information culminates over
several periods. We contribute to the existing literature
on capacity coordination in supply chains by showing
that repeated game strategies lead to a significant
degree of forecast misrepresentation, although they
theoretically support the truth-telling equilibrium.
However, forecast misrepresentation is more
pronounced in review strategies. This behavioral effect
is diametrically opposed to the theoretically predicted
benefit of review strategies.

1. Introduction
Consider a buyer (female pronouns) who asks her
long-term supplier (male pronouns) to build capacity for
a newly developed, innovative product’s component.
Before and while developing the product, the buyer
conducts market research to estimate the market
potential of this product and gain further end-customer
insights. The buyer therefore obtains demand forecasts
that are not immediately available to the supplier, but
are valuable for his capacity decisions. When facing a
low demand forecast, the buyer can choose between two
information sharing strategies: First, she may signal a
high demand forecast to her supplier, thereby
encouraging a high capacity investment. However, if her
orders turn out to be low, she risks losing her supplier’s
trust in their future business interactions. Second, she
may want to avoid the risk of losing her supplier’s trust
and therefore share the real demand forecast.
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To foster honest information sharing, the supplier
may setup an information technology system that
ignores (punishes) apparently inflated demand
forecasts. In our model context, the basic punishment
strategy idea is to avoid forecast inflation through the
supplier’s threat to ignore future forecasts if the buyer’s
orders turn out to be low, although she reported a high
demand forecast. Trigger strategies – that punish
apparently misstated forecasts immediately - would
entirely avoid efficiency losses if a forecast can be
unambiguously identified as either honest, or a lie.
However, random demand events outside the buyer’s
control, may render an initially truthfully shared
forecast highly unlikely. In this case, trigger strategies
result in ignored forecasts although the buyer reported
honestly, thus implying an unnecessary loss in
efficiency. Review strategies overcome this issue by
observing a buyer’s forecasting behavior over several
periods and only punish after repeated anomalies.
Review strategies dominate trigger strategies, because
they are expected to introduce punishment phases less
often [23]).
While the theoretical comparison of trigger and
review strategies provides a clear-cut prediction for
supply chains with rational and profit-maximizing
actors, it is not clear if review strategies’ efficiency
gains can be sustained for real decision makers, who
may act boundedly rational, or pursue objectives other
than profit maximization. In this study, we conduct
laboratory experiments to evaluate review strategies.
Although we believe that research on repeated game
strategies can benefit from other empirical approaches
(e.g., interview studies), we see one central advantage in
experiments: With experiments, the critical aspects of
repeated game strategies can be controlled and therefore
a highly internally valid comparison of review and
trigger strategies is possible. It is difficult to evaluate
repeated game strategies in the field, as it seems highly
problematic for researchers to discern whether
analytical forecasts (e.g., from an enterprise resource
planning systems) are inflated due to good will (e.g.,

Page 1528

factoring in expert knowledge), or due to strategic
considerations (e.g., encouraging high capacity
investments).
We focus our study very specifically on buyers’
information sharing behavior. Buyers deal with an
automated (computerized) supplier who follows a
repeated game strategy, i.e., a trigger strategy, or a
review strategy. We design the repeated game strategies
such that truth-telling is the profit maximizing strategy.
With this design, we ensure that all of the proposed
repeated game strategy’s critical parameters are
common knowledge (e.g., the signals that are assessed
as non-reliable, the kind of punishment after a nonreliable assessment, etc.). Implementing an automated
strategy separates us – to the best of our knowledge –
from existing experimental studies on lying: Several
studies investigate the antecedents of lying, or the
impact of punishment and reputation systems on
information sharing in human-human interaction (see
literature review). However, an analysis of whether
subjects follow a certain equilibrium strategy induced
by another automated player following a repeated game
strategy is not part of this literature. This distinction is
important, because in human-human interactions
without common-knowledge pre-committed repeated
game strategies, lying may occur because the
information sharing party correctly perceives this as the
payoff maximizing strategy. In our setup, however, we
rule this motive out by ensuring that truth-telling is
payoff maximizing. We can therefore focus precisely on
the behavioral effects of direct punishments (trigger
strategy) vs. delayed punishments (review strategies) on
truth-telling and supply chain efficiency.
Our contribution to the supply chain literature on
forecast sharing and coordination is twofold. First, we
show that there is a substantial degree of lying, even in
situations where truth-telling is the profit-maximizing
strategy. We observe that our analyzed review strategies
are less effective than theoretically predicted. Thus, the
gap between explicitly defined repeated game strategies
and unstructured repeated interaction is lower than
normative analysis predicts. Second, we show that
buyers confronted with a review strategy convey
unreliable signals significantly more often than buyers
confronted with a trigger strategy. The theoretically
predicted effect of fewer punishment phases in review
strategies is offset by the behavioral tendency to lie
more frequently. Overall, we find no significant supply
chain performance differences between the trigger
strategy and the review strategy.

2. Literature Review

1

induction then indicates that the finitely repeated game collapses to
the one-shot game [13].

The sequential rationality concept predicts that there is no
coordination in the last round of the game. Applying backward

In the remainder, we discuss theoretical and
experimental work on information sharing in the supply
chain management area, before reviewing experimental
work that addresses information sharing conflicts in
more general settings.

2.1 Supply chain management
A lack of information sharing may cause efficiency
losses (see, among other, [6, 19, 23] and the references
therein). However, since supply chain parties are legally
independent, differing goals may hamper truthful
information sharing and the trust of the information
receiving party may be lost due to the parties’ strategic
interaction. Information sharing in supply chains
attracts research on normative models and on behavioral
studies.
The normative stream analyzes how coordination
mechanisms, such as contractual agreements, or
repeated game strategies, provide incentives to ensure
truth-telling and trust between the supply chain parties.
Corresponding work assumes that all parties are totally
rational utility maximizers. Models of one-shot games,
or finitely repeated games1, show that complex nonlinear signaling, or screening, schemes can boost supply
chain efficiency compared to simple linear transfer
schemes (wholesale price contracts). While the research
on signaling and screening contracts culminated in an
immense body of knowledge for all kinds of supply
chain planning situations (see [4, 6] and citing articles),
there is still little empirical evidence that these contract
formats are widely applied in practice (see [23], p. 81,
or [5], pp. 474). Signaling and screening contracts often
only serve as a benchmark for simpler schemes.
Moreover, simpler wholesale price contracts prove to be
effective when coupled with repeated game strategies
(e.g., trigger strategy, review strategy) in infinitely
repeated games. In this case, cooperation can be
sustained if the future is valued sufficiently high, i.e.,
the discount factor is sufficiently large [23, 25–27]. We
contribute to the literature on information sharing in
supply chains by comparing two repeated game
strategies ― a trigger strategy and a review strategy ―
in controlled laboratory experiments with a specific
focus on buyers’ behavior.
The behavioral work on information sharing in
supply chains challenges the normative prediction that
shared information is nothing but cheap talk (see [7] for
a comprehensive review on cheap talk experiments).
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Özer et al. [21, 22], Hyndman et al. [17], and EbrahimKhanjari et al. [9] study the performance of wholesale
price contracts in combination with - theoretically
ineffective – forecast information sharing in laboratory
experiments. A general insight is that the theoretical
analysis of strategic forecast inflation in wholesale price
contracts overstates the observed efficiency losses,
because human decision makers tend to trust
information that they believe is truthfully shared. We
contribute to this stream of research by analyzing the
information sharing behavior in a situation where truthtelling is the expected profit maximizing strategy.

2.2 Information sharing in laboratory
experiments
Two players usually interact in behavioral
experiments on information sharing: One player
communicates the private information, while the other
player receives the signal. Experimental literature
focuses on two aspects of the game, (1) the reaction of
the signal receiver to non-reliable signals, and (2) the
preconditions which influence the sender’s signal. In
this literature review, as in our experiment, we focus on
the behavior of the signal sender (= buyer) (e.g., [3]).
In experimental studies, lying, i.e., senders reporting
non-reliable signals, frequently occurs, because it
maximizes the sender’s payoff. For example, only 39%
of all subjects are honest and if they do not interact with
others, the observed signal is private information, which
even the experimenter does not know [12]. As soon as
the subjects interact with other subjects, the relative
frequency of honesty increases to 56% [24], or 66%
[16], suggesting that the degree of lie aversion [20]
increases if another subject faces negative consequences
due to non-reliable signals. The frequency of nonreliable signals also depends on how often these
negative consequences occur: Subjects behave more
honest when the negative impact that lying has on others
increases [14]. In our experimental design, the signal
receiving supplier is an automated agent. Lying,
therefore, has no financial consequences for human
subjects and, from a behavioral perspective, seems more
likely to be observed. Our experimental design,
therefore, tests repeated game strategies when it seems
most beneficial to apply them.
The frequency of lying does not only depend on its
impact on others, but also on individual benefits. As the
frequency of non-reliable signals decreases, the lower
the own benefit from such signals are [14]. Hence, one
does not expect any non-reliable signals if the signal
sender derives no monetary benefit from providing such
signals. In addition, the frequency of non-reliable
signals increases if the true signal is never revealed to
the recipient [2]. In other words, lying increases if the

buyer knows that the supplier will never discover
whether the signal he received from the buyer was
honest or not. In sum, a simple way to decrease nonreliable signals is to ensure that such signals have a
negative effect.
A simple approach to reduce the benefit of nonreliable signals is to observe the behavior of subjects and
to punish frequent non-reliable signals by means of a
reputation mechanism. The effect of reputation
mechanisms and punishment has been studied more
generally in cooperative acts, in which the behavior of
others is directly observable and can therefore be
punished more than in unverifiable information sharing.
Initially, cooperation is high, but decreases over time if
it is repeated finitely (e.g., [1, 28]). The punishment of
uncooperative behavior primarily helps to sustain
cooperation over time [10]. While uncooperative
behavior can be clearly identified and punished exactly
when such actions are observable, punishments are less
effective when they are not observable. In other words,
if players only see the outcome, but not the associated
action, they do not punish as often [15]. For our
experiments, this implies that buyers would not expect
too much punishment if game strategies are not
repeated, because behavior cannot unambiguously be
identified as cooperative or not. Thus, our study
contributes in this context by determining whether
carefully structured strategies can overcome this
behavioral tendency by providing automated
punishment rules.
In sum, the existing literature clearly shows that
punishment mechanisms foster cooperation. However,
this effect is usually hampered when signals’ reliability
can only be assessed probabilistically. Repeated game
strategies seem to be a good candidate to boost
efficiency in such environments. Since signals in our
setting cannot be unambiguously categorized as truthful
or not, trigger strategies are theoretically less effective
than review strategies. We contribute to the existing
literature by comparing competing strategies in
carefully devised laboratory experiments.

3. Repeated game strategies
One-shot game: We consider the supply chain setup
as described in Ren et al. [23]. The supplier has to build
up capacity, 𝐾, before the end-customer demand, 𝑑, is
realized. The buyer orders the realized demand, 𝑑, from
her supplier, which yields an end-customer price of 𝑟.
The supplier charges a wholesale price, 𝑤, for every unit
delivered to the buyer. The supplier’s unit capacity cost
is 𝑐. Table 1 summarizes the notation of the game.
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Table 1. Notation of the one-shot game
𝐷𝑖 , 𝑖 ∈ {ℎ, 𝑙}; 𝑑
𝐹𝑖 (∙); 𝑓𝑖 (∙), 𝑖
∈ {ℎ, 𝑙}
𝜇𝑖 ; 𝜎𝑖 , 𝑖 ∈ {ℎ, 𝑙}
𝑝
𝑟
𝑤
𝑐
𝑠 ∈ {ℎ, 𝑙}
𝐾𝑎 , 𝑎 ∈ (0, ℎ, 𝑙)
𝜋 𝑆 (∙), 𝜋 𝐵 (∙)
𝐵
𝜋0𝐵 , 𝜋𝑙,ℎ

Random end-customer demand;
demand realization from 𝐷𝑖
Cumulative distribution function
(CDF); probability distribution
function (PDF) for 𝐷𝑖
Mean; standard deviation of 𝐷𝑖
with 𝜎ℎ = 𝜎𝑙 = 𝜎
Probability of high market
demand
End-customer price
Wholesale price (paid from buyer
to supplier) for each unit
delivered
Supplier’s unit capacity cost
Customer’s signal of demand
forecast
Capacity decision of supplier
under trust, 𝑠 = 𝑎, and mistrust,
𝑎=0
Expected profits supplier (S),
buyer (B)
Buyer’s ex-ante expected profits
under mistrust and trust
respectively

The end-customer demand, 𝐷𝑖 , 𝑖 = {ℎ, 𝑙}, is random
and follows either a distribution with a (relatively) low
mean, 𝜇𝑙 , or a relatively high mean, 𝜇ℎ . The standard
deviation, 𝜎, is identical for both demand distributions.
The CDFs and PDFs are denoted by 𝐹 𝑖 (∙) 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑓𝑖 (∙), 𝑖 =
{ℎ, 𝑙} respectively. The demand distribution that is
relevant for a given period follows a Bernoulli process.
The a priori probability of facing the end-customer
demand distribution 𝐷 ℎ is 𝑝. The a priori probability of
facing the end-customer demand 𝐷𝑙 is 1 − 𝑝.
Information about the relevant demand distribution in a
period is asymmetric. The buyer knows which one of the
two distributions the end-customer demand follows in a
given period, while her supplier only knows the a priori
probabilities.
Forecast sharing: The buyer possesses more
accurate forecast information than her supplier. The
buyer knows the relevant period’s demand distribution,
while her supplier only knows the a priori probabilities
of the demand distributions. The supplier is interested in
a more accurate demand forecast, because this would
enable him to better tailor the capacity to actual market
conditions. The buyer can share her private demand
forecast via a non-binding signal 𝑠 = {ℎ, 𝑙}. Her supplier
may trust the signal and make his capacity decision, 𝐾𝑠 ,
assuming that the demand follows 𝐷𝑠 . Alternatively, the
supplier may ignore the signal (further on denoted as
2

As with Ren et al. [23], we assume that all supply chain actors are
fully rational and expected profit maximizers. This implicitly
assumes that the payoffs of the other party do not matter (i.e., other
regarding preferences are absent). However, considering interaction

punishment) and build up capacity 𝐾0 . Figure 1
summarizes the one-shot game’s decision sequence.

Figure 1. Decision sequence in the one-shot
game
The buyer’s and supplier’s profits depend on the
actual demand distribution, 𝐷𝑖 , and the supplier’s
capacity decision 𝐾𝑎 , 𝑎 ∈ (0, ℎ, 𝑙).2
𝜋 𝑆 (𝐷𝑖 , 𝐾𝑎 ) = 𝑤 ∙ ∫

𝐾𝑎

𝑑 ⋅ 𝑓𝑖 (𝑑)𝑑𝑑 + 𝑤

0

∞

⋅ ∫ 𝐾𝛼 ⋅ 𝑓𝑖 (𝑑)𝑑𝑑 − 𝐾𝑎 ⋅ 𝑐
𝐾𝑎

(1)

𝐾𝑎

= 𝑤 ∙ ∫ (𝑑 − 𝐾𝑎 ) ∙ 𝑓𝑖 (𝑑) 𝑑𝑑
0

+ (𝑤 − 𝑐) ∙ 𝐾𝑎
𝜋 𝐵 (𝐷𝑖 , 𝐾𝑎 ) = (𝑟 − 𝑤)

𝐾𝑎

𝑑 ⋅ 𝑓𝑖 (𝑑)𝑑𝑑 + (𝑟 − 𝑤)

∙∫
0
∞

⋅ ∫ 𝐾𝑎 ⋅ 𝑓𝑖 (𝑑)𝑑𝑑

(2)

𝐾𝑎

= (𝑟 − 𝑤) ∙ 𝜇𝑖 − (𝑟 − 𝑤)
∞

∙ ∫ (𝑑 − 𝐾𝑎 ) 𝑓𝑖 (𝑑) 𝑑𝑑
𝐾𝑎

We assume that a trusting supplier builds up the
supply chain’s optimal capacity. Thus, the supplier
considers the supply chain’s profit margin, 𝑟 − 𝑐,
instead of his individual profit margin, 𝑤 − 𝑐 (see [23]
p. 85). The supplier’s optimal capacity decision under
trust then follows from:
𝐾

𝐾𝑠 = arg max 𝑟 ∙ ∫ (𝑑 − 𝐾) ∙ 𝑓𝑠 (𝑑) 𝑑𝑑 + (𝑟 − 𝑐)

(3)
0
∙ 𝐾 with 𝑠 ∈ (ℎ, 𝑙).
The supplier may also mistrust the signal and make his
capacity decision based on the a priori information:
𝐾

𝐾

𝐾 0 = argmax 𝑝 ∙ (𝑤 ∙ ∫ (𝑑 − 𝐾) ∙ 𝑓ℎ (𝑑) 𝑑𝑑 )
𝐾

0

+ (1 − 𝑝)

(4)

𝐾

∙ (𝑤 ∙ ∫ (𝑑 − 𝐾) ∙ 𝑓𝑙 (𝑑) 𝑑𝑑 )
0

+ (𝑤 − 𝑐) ∙ 𝐾.

Further, we denote the buyer’s ex-ante expected
profits (i.e., expected profits before the buyer
of supply chain actors (e.g., the buyer lies, the supplier suffers, and
the buyer cares about this fact) might trigger various sorts of
behavior (esp. related to other regarding preferences). As it stands
now, we abstract from this issue.
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determined the actual demand distribution for the
period) under mistrust
𝜋0𝐵 = 𝑝𝜋 𝐵 (𝐷ℎ , 𝐾 0 ) + (1 − 𝑝)𝜋 𝐵 (𝐷𝑙 , 𝐾0 )
and under trust
𝐵
𝜋𝑙,ℎ
= 𝑝𝜋 𝐵 (𝐷ℎ , 𝐾ℎ ) + (1 − 𝑝)𝜋 𝐵 (𝐷𝑙 , 𝐾 𝑙 )

(5)
(6)

It has been well established that the buyer’s
dominant strategy in the one-shot game is to signal a
high demand forecast, while the supplier’s dominant
strategy is to ignore the forecast. The supply chain
parties are caught in a babbling equilibrium (see [23]).
We briefly review the underlying line of argumentation.
Since the buyer does not carry any unit capacity
costs, 𝑐, she has a strict preference for higher capacity
levels. Because a trusting supplier builds up higher
capacity under a high forecast than under a low forecast,
𝐾ℎ > 𝐾𝑙 , the buyer’s dominant strategy is to always
signal a high demand forecast 𝑠 = ℎ. The supplier
anticipates this uninformative signaling behavior and
ignores/mistrusts the conveyed demand forecast.
Repeated interaction & review strategy: Similar
to Ren et al. [23], we model a long-lasting supplierbuyer relationship as an infinitely repeated game. The
notation used for the analysis of the review strategy is
summarized in Table 2. Let 𝑡 denote the time index of
the stage game. The same decision sequence applies as
in the one-stage game (see Figure 1). The discount rate
is denoted by 𝛿. Time is divided into a sequence of
review phases and punishment phases. The maximum
length of a review phase is 𝑅 periods, the length of a
punishment phase is 𝑀. During a review phase, the
supplier evaluates by comparing the forecast with the
order via statistical inference if the buyer’s conveyed
forecast is credible or not. If the reported forecast is
assessed as credible, a credibility index 𝐼𝑡 is
incremented by one. Low demand forecasts are always
assessed as credible. When forecasts are high, the
credibility index is only incremented if the determined
demand is larger than a critical value, 𝑑 ≥ 𝑑 𝑢 . The
credibility index is not incremented for demand
realizations smaller than 𝑑𝑢 , i.e., 𝐼𝑡 = 𝐼𝑡−1 . Thus,
similar to truth-telling, the probability of being
evaluated as credible is
𝑆 = 𝑝[1 − 𝐹ℎ (𝑑𝑢 )] + (1 − 𝑝)
(7)
The buyer fails the review at the end of a review
phase if 𝐼𝑅 < 𝑞, and passes the review if 𝐼𝑅 ≥ 𝑞, where
𝑞 denotes the credibility threshold. A review phase is
restarted if the buyer no longer has an incentive to report
truthfully, because her trust index is too high. We
elaborate on the restart of a review phase later in this
paper.
We denote the buyer’s normalized expected profits
at the beginning of the game as 𝜋𝑧𝐵 , and the normalized
expected profits when there are n periods remaining in

the review phase (i.e., in period 𝑡 = 𝑅 − 𝑛) and given a
𝐵
trust index 𝐼𝑡 = 𝑥, as 𝜋𝑛,𝑥
.
Table 2. Notation of the repeated game and the
review strategy
𝑡
𝐼𝑡
𝑞
𝑑𝑢
𝑅
𝑛
𝑀
𝛿
𝑆
𝜆
𝑡𝑠
𝜋𝑧𝐵 (∙)
𝐵
𝜋𝑛,𝑥

Time index of the stage game (period)
Credibility index in period t
Credibility threshold
Demand realization threshold below which a
high demand forecast signal is assessed as
untruthful (𝑑 < 𝑑𝑢 )
Length of the review phase
Number of periods remaining in the review
phase
Length of the punishment phase
Discount factor
Probability of being evaluated as trustworthy
when reporting honestly
Probability of failing the review despite
reporting honestly
Earliest point at which a review phase is
restarted
Buyer’s normalized expected profits at the
beginning of a review phase
Buyer’s normalized expected profits when
there are n periods remaining in the review
phase (i.e., in period t = R − n) and given a
trust index 𝐼𝑡 = 𝑥.

Truth-telling equilibrium: For our laboratory
experiments, we construct the review strategy
parameters in such a manner that truth-telling and trust
form an equilibrium. The review strategy parameters
must therefore ensure that a) in each period during the
review phase, the buyer conveys the forecast truthfully,
even if the trust index needs to be incremented in order
to avoid failing the review, and b) that the buyer reports
the forecast truthfully at the beginning of a new review
phase.
We first formalize condition (a) ― that is, the
buyer’s credibility index 𝐼𝑡 must be incremented in all
periods 1 ≤ 𝑛 ≤ 𝑅 − 1 ― in order to avoid failing the
review. In any given period of the review phase, the
buyer reports truthfully whether
𝐵
(1 − 𝛿)𝜋 𝐵 (𝐾ℎ , 𝐷𝑙 ) + 𝛿(1 − 𝐹𝑙 (𝑑𝑢 ))𝜋𝑛−1,𝑞−(𝑛−1)
+ 𝐹𝑙 (𝑑𝑢 )[𝛿(1 − 𝛿 𝑀 )𝜋0𝐵
+ 𝛿 𝑀+1 𝜋𝑧𝐵 ]
≤ (1 − 𝛿)𝜋 𝐵 (𝐾𝑙 , 𝐷𝑙 )
𝐵
+ 𝛿(1 − 𝐹ℎ (𝑑𝑢 ))𝜋𝑛−1,𝑞−(𝑛−1)
𝑀
+ 𝐹ℎ (𝑑𝑢 )[𝛿(1 − 𝛿 )𝜋0𝐵
+ 𝛿 𝑀+1 𝜋𝑧𝐵 ]

(8 )

The left-hand side of (8) formalizes the buyer’s
normalized expected profits when lying. The first term
is the normalized expected profit when facing low
demand and reporting high demand. The second term
depicts the normalized expected profits when the lie is
not revealed (i.e., the demand is higher than the
threshold 𝑑𝑢 ), and the trust index is therefore
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incremented by one. The third term depicts the
normalized expected profits when the lie is detected
(i.e., the demand is lower than the threshold 𝑑𝑢 ). In this
case, the buyer faces 𝑀 periods of mistrust. Afterwards,
a new review phase starts with normalized expected
profits of 𝜋𝑧𝐵 . In turn, the right-hand side of (8)
formalizes the normalized expected profits when the
buyer reports truthfully. Because of the stochastic nature
of a signal assessed as credible even under truthful
reporting, all three basic terms on the left-hand side of
the inequality also occur. Rearranging (8) gives
𝜋 𝐵 (𝐾ℎ , 𝐷𝑙 ) − 𝜋 𝐵 (𝐾𝑙 , 𝐷𝑙 )
𝐹𝑙 (𝑑𝑢 ) − 𝐹ℎ (𝑑𝑢 )
𝐵
≤
[𝛿𝜋𝑛−1,𝑞−(𝑛−1)
(1 − 𝛿)
− [𝛿(1 − 𝛿 𝑀 )𝜋0𝐵 + 𝛿 𝑀+1 𝜋𝑧𝐵 ]]

(9)

We can replace (see [23] p. 89)
𝑖=0

𝐵
∙ ((𝜋𝑙,ℎ
− 𝜋𝑧𝐵 )

(10)

𝑛−1

𝛿 𝑀 𝜋𝑧𝐵 ] ∑ (1
𝑖=1

𝑅 − 𝑞 + 𝑖 𝑅−𝑞+𝑖+1 𝑖
(
)𝛿
𝑆 (1 − 𝑆)𝑅−𝑞
𝑅−𝑞
𝑞 − 1 + 𝑖 𝑞+1
−∑
(
) 𝛿 (1 − 𝑆)𝑖 𝑆 𝑞−1 ]
𝑞−1
𝑖=0
𝑀
𝑅 − 1 𝑞−1
−(
) 𝑆 (1 − 𝑆)𝑅−𝑞 ∑ 𝛿 𝑅+𝑖 (𝜋𝑧𝐵
𝑅−𝑞
𝑖=1
𝑖=0
𝑅−𝑞−1

𝜋 𝐵 (𝐾ℎ , 𝐷𝑙 ) − 𝜋 𝐵 (𝐾𝑙 , 𝐷𝑙 )
(𝐹𝑙 (𝑑𝑢 ) − 𝐹ℎ (𝑑𝑢 ))
≤
𝛿
(1 − 𝛿)
𝜋𝑧𝐵

(𝑆𝛿)𝑖

∑
𝑖=0

+
+ [(1 − 𝛿 𝑀 )𝜋0𝐵

(11)

𝑛−1

+ 𝛿 𝑀 𝜋𝑧𝐵 ] (∑

(1

𝑖=1

− 𝑆)𝛿 𝑖 𝑆 𝑖−1 − 1)]

The buyer’s normalized profits at the beginning of a
review phase can be approximated by (see [23] p. 92)
𝜋𝑧𝐵 =

𝐵
(1 − 𝛿𝑅−𝑞 )𝜋𝑙,ℎ
𝜆
1 − 𝛿𝑅−𝑞+𝑀 𝜆 − 𝛿 𝑡𝑠 (1 − 𝜆)
𝛿𝑅−𝑞 (1 − 𝛿 𝑀 )𝜋0𝐵 𝜆
+
1 − 𝛿𝑅−𝑞+𝑀 𝜆 − 𝛿 𝑡𝑠 (1 − 𝜆)
𝐵
(1 − 𝛿 𝑡𝑠 )𝜋𝑙,ℎ
(1 − 𝜆)
+
𝑅−𝑞+𝑀
1−𝛿
𝜆 − 𝛿 𝑡𝑠 (1 − 𝜆)

(12)

where 𝜆 denotes the probability that the customer
will fail the review despite reporting truthfully and 𝑡𝑠
denotes the earliest point at which the review phase can
be restarted. Ren et al. [23] show that the likelihood of
the buyer failing the review if she reports the forecast
always truthfully and is only evaluated at date 𝑅,
determines an upper bound for this probability. This

3

(14)

− 𝜋0𝐵 )) ≥ 𝜋 𝐵 (𝐾ℎ , 𝐷𝑙 ) − 𝜋 𝐵 (𝐾𝑙 , 𝐷𝑙 )

𝑛−2

(𝑆𝛿)𝑛−1

𝑞−2

∙ [∑

− 𝑆)𝛿 𝑖 𝑆 𝑖−1

in (9) and it follows

𝐵
𝛿)𝜋𝑙,ℎ

(13)

A review phase is restarted if the buyer has no
incentive to truthfully report a forecast, because her trust
index is too high. Thus, we do not only have to check
whether the buyer reports truthfully if the trust index has
to be incremented in each period, i.e., 𝐼𝑛 = 𝑞 − 𝑛, but
also whether one or more forecasts might still not be
reliable, i.e., 𝐼𝑛 > 𝑞 − 𝑛.3 We now formulate condition
(b) that must hold in a truth-telling equilibrium.
In the first period of a new review phase (where there
is still leeway to be assessed as not reliable without
failing the review), the buyer reports truthfully as long
as the following inequality holds:
(𝐹𝑙 (𝑑𝑢 ) − 𝐹ℎ (𝑑𝑢 ))

(𝑆𝛿)𝑖

+ 𝜋𝑧𝐵 (𝑆𝛿)𝑛−1
+ [(1 − 𝛿 𝑀 )𝜋0𝐵

∙ [(1 −

𝑅
𝜆=(
) (1 − 𝑆)𝑅−𝑞+1 𝑆 𝑞−1
𝑅−𝑞+1

𝑛−2

𝐵
𝐵
𝜋𝑛−1,𝑞−(𝑛−1)
= (1 − 𝛿)𝜋𝑙,ℎ
∑

+

probability follows a binomial distribution, i.e., we use
the following upper bound

Note that a punishment phase may not be triggered even if some of
the reports are assessed as untruthful, as long as 𝑅 ≠ 𝑞. This is the
theoretical advantage of review strategies, because punishment phases

The left-hand side of Formula (14) depicts the
benefit of reporting truthfully in a given period by
mapping all possible payoff paths and the corresponding
probabilities. As long as the inequality holds, the buyer
has no incentive to report dishonestly in order to obtain
the short-term gain depicted on the right-hand side of
the inequality. We refer to Ren et al. [23] (p. 90) for
further interpretation of this formula.
Finally, from (14), we can compute the earliest point
at which a review phase is restarted, which we need in
order to numerically evaluate the incentive
compatibility in (a). The buyer has the least incentive to
report truthfully if the trust index has been incremented
in each period so far, i.e., if 𝐼𝑅−𝑛 = 𝑅 − 𝑛. Thus, the
earliest point at which the review phase may be restarted
can be computed numerically by iteratively reducing 𝑅
and 𝑞 in formula (14) by one unit. Once the left-hand
side of formula (14) turns negative, the earliest point 𝑡𝑠
is identified and can be replaced in (12). The obtained
lower bound of 𝜋𝑧𝐵 can then be used to calculate
incentive compatibility in formula (11).
Finally, note that we refer to a review strategy
whenever the buyer might be evaluated as dishonest at
are expected to occur less frequently than in a trigger strategy, where
𝑅 = 𝑞.
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least once (i.e., the credibility index is not incremented),
while not entering the punishment phase, i.e., credibility
index is smaller than the review length (𝑞 < 𝑅). We
refer to a trigger strategy whenever each negative
assessment leads directly to punishments (i.e., 𝑅 = 𝑞).

review phase, on her signal 𝑠. The supplier’s capacity
decisions are 𝐾0 = 132.79, 𝐾𝑙 = 150, 𝐾ℎ = 300. The
buyer’s expected profits in the review phase and
punishment phase are summarized in Table 3.

4.2 Experimental procedure and design

4. Experiment
The focus of our experiment is the buyer’s reaction
to a supplier’s given repeated game strategy. We
analyze the performance of two repeated game
strategies ― the review strategy and the trigger strategy
― by varying the credibility threshold 𝑞 and the review
length 𝑅 between treatments. We designed the repeated
game strategies such that they support truth-telling. We
automated the supplier’s decision and thereby eliminate
potential fairness concerns in the supply chain
interaction. All parameters were known to the buyer,
such that we expected a fully rational and profitmaximizing buyer to report truthfully throughout the
game. In the following, we first present the game
parameters that are identical in both treatments,
thereafter we turn to our treatment design, and finally
we present the details of our experimental procedure.

4.1 Parameterization
Customer demand is normally distributed with
𝐷𝑙 ~𝒩(150, 402 ) and 𝐷ℎ ~𝒩(300, 402 ). The high
demand distribution has an a priori probability of 𝑝 =
0.5. We set the end-customer price to 𝑟 = 12, the
wholesale price to 𝑤 = 7, and the unit capacity cost to
𝑐 = 6.
At the end of each period, a random draw decides,
with probability 0.1, whether the game ends, or another
base game is played. We thus induce a discount factor
of 𝛿 = 0.9. A high forecast signal 𝑠 = ℎ is assessed as
credible if 𝑑 ≥ 𝑑𝑢 = 200. A punishment phase of 𝑀 =
4 periods starts if the buyer cannot reach the credibility
threshold 𝑞 in the remainder of the current review phase.
Table 3. Buyer payoff matrix
Low demand 𝑫𝒍
Review phase
𝒔=𝒍
𝜋 𝐵 (𝐷𝑙 , 𝐾𝑙 ) = 690.16
𝒔=𝒉
𝜋 𝐵 (𝐷𝑙 , 𝐾ℎ ) = 750.00
High demand 𝑫𝒉
Review phase
𝒔=𝒍
𝒔=𝒉

𝜋 𝐵 (𝐷ℎ , 𝐾𝑙 ) = 749.40
𝜋 𝐵 (𝐷ℎ , 𝐾ℎ ) = 1,380.30

Punishment
phase
𝜋 𝐵 (𝐷𝑙 , 𝐾0 )
= 637.54
Punishment
phase
𝜋 𝐵 (𝐷ℎ , 𝐾0 )
= 663.70

The payoff in each of the buyer’s periods depends
on the demand realization 𝑑, the current phase ― i.e.,
the review phase or the punishment phase ― and, in the

We recruited 48 subjects from a seminar on
behavioral economics to participate in our experiments.
We randomly assigned the subjects to one of two
sessions (26 subjects to session 1 and 22 subjects to
session 2). All subjects participated in two treatments:
the review treatment and the trigger treatment. We thus
focused on a with-in subject comparison. In session 1
(2), we started with the review (trigger) treatment,
followed by the trigger (review) treatment. We
randomized the number of periods per treatment and
session before conducting the experiment (review
treatment: 30 periods; trigger treatment: 25 periods) but
did not inform the subjects how many rounds they
would be playing. The subjects only knew the
probabilities with which we simulated the number of
rounds. In both treatments and sessions, we ensured that
the relative frequency of high and low demands was
equal within a review phase and within a punishment
phase. By this means, we ensured that there were no
highly unlikely realization sequences that could
confound our results.
We played the review treatment with a review phase
lasting for 𝑅 = 10 and a credibility threshold of 𝑞 = 9
to evaluate the effect of the review phase. The earliest
point at which the review phase is restarted is 𝑡𝑆 = 4.
The trigger treatment has a review phase of 𝑅 = 1 and
a credibility threshold of 𝑞 = 1, i.e., the buyer must be
assessed as credible in each period in order to avoid
entering the punishment phase.
At the start of each session, we assigned each subject
to a random seat in the laboratory. The subjects received
written instructions (see online appendix at
http://www.emwifo.ovgu.de/Research/Supplementary+
material.html) that captured the contents of the
experiment that did not change between treatments. All
the relevant game and treatment data were available on
the computer screen. We answered all questions in
private, before we played 20 training periods with 𝛿 =
0.0, which we did not pay off. Thereafter, each subject
played the two computerized treatments (z-Tree, [11]):
the review treatment and the trigger treatment. Beside
the parameters described in Section 4.1, the computer
screen displayed the probability for every combination
of low and high demand in the remaining periods of the
current review/punishment phase, as well as the
distribution of demands 𝑑 for both 𝐷𝑙 and 𝐷ℎ . After the
two treatments, we paid the subjects according to their
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performance in the game. The subjects received €0.25
for 1,000 points. All in all, the subjects earned an
average of €13.62 for an experiment lasting about two
hours.

the average honesty in the trigger treatment per period.
In sum, we find - in contrast to game theoretic prediction
- lying in both treatments, but a higher level in the
review treatment.

5. Results

5.2 Punishments

In the remainder of this section, we present the
experimental results. We focus our analysis on the first
20 periods, ensuring that every honest player who is not
mistakenly identified as not reliable, played at least two
complete review phases of 10 periods.

According to Ren et al. [23], we should expect fewer
punishment phases in our review treatment than in the
trigger treatment if all the subjects were to follow the
truth-telling strategy. However, we observe more lying
in the review treatment (see Section 5.1) than in the
trigger treatment. This effect might diminish the
theoretically positive consequences of not directly
entering the punishment phase in the review treatment
once a subject is assessed as not reliable.
Subjects in the review treatment enter the
punishment phase an average 0.58 times (SD: 0.77),
while they enter it 0.71 times (SD: 1.05) in the trigger
treatment. Contrary to the theoretical prediction under a
truth-telling strategy, the mean frequency of the
punishment phases does not differ significantly between
the treatments (Wilcoxon test, two-sided, p=0.475).
As argued above, the lack of treatment differences
might be due to a higher lying frequency in the review
treatment. We therefore analyze the impact of lying on
the frequency of punishment phases in a mixed effect
logistic regression, using each decision (per period and
subject) as one observation.
Table 4. Regression analysis of influencing
factors on punishment in the next period

5.1 Honesty
According to Ren et al. [23], we designed the review
strategy such that truth-telling and trust is the payoff
maximizing strategy, i.e., we expect the subjects to
report their true demand distribution throughout the
game. Since the punishment cost for the subject is
identical in both treatments, and the consequences of
being assessed as non-reliable are more direct in the
trigger treatment (i.e., assessed non-reliability
immediately leads to a punishment phase), truth-telling
and trust are also the equilibrium in this treatment. In
sum, we expect truth-telling in both treatments
throughout all periods.

Figure 2. Honesty per period of review phase
(given 𝒅 = 𝒍)
In the review treatment, nine subjects never lie,
while 30 subjects never lie in the trigger treatment. In
88% (standard deviation [SD]: 0.26) of all occurrences
of a low demand, the subjects in the trigger treatment
are honest. In the review treatment, however, the
subjects are only honest in 75% (SD: 0.23) of the
periods with low demand. Hence, the subjects are
significantly more honest in the trigger treatment than in
the review treatment (Wilcoxon test, two-sided,
p=0.001). Note that the high probability of lying in the
review treatment is not solely based on behavior in the
4th period (𝑡𝑆 = 4) of the review phase to ensure that the
review phase lasts for 10 periods (see Figure 2, dashed
vertical line): In 8 out of 10 periods in the review phase,
the average honesty in the review treatment lies below

Model I
Model II
# of lies
-3.932
(0.34)**
Dummy
0.197
(0.26)
0.852
(0.29)**
trigger
Intercept
-3.634
(0.23)**
-5.472
(0.36)**
N
1920
1920
AIC
562.6
384.6
BIC
579.3
406.9
Log likel. -278.3
-188.3
Notes: The significance levels of the observed
coefficients are: ** 𝑝 < 0.01. No star indicates
significance levels 𝑝 > 0.1 (AIC - Akaike information
criterion, BIC - Bayesian information criterion)

The variable “# of lies” captures the number of not
reliable signals the buyer reported to the supplier in
previous periods of the treatment. For example, the
former variable would be two for a buyer who reported
reliably in eight out of the ten previous periods. The
dummy trigger is one for our trigger treatment and
captures the treatment differences. The results in Table
4 show that the likelihood of punishment phases
increases with the number of lies and is significantly
higher in our trigger treatment (column “Model II”). We
further observe that this effect is non-significant if we
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omit to account for the number of lies (column “Model
I”). Thus, the results clearly highlight that the positive
effects of fewer punishment phases in the review
treatment does not continue empirically, because buyers
exhibit less reliable reporting behavior.

5.2 Payoff consequences
The subjects earned on average 1,003.50 points per
round (𝑆𝐷: 87.81) in the review treatment compared to
an average of 975.53 points per round (𝑆𝐷: 108.15) in
the trigger treatment. Although the average payoff in the
review treatment is higher than in the trigger treatment,
it does not differ significantly (Wilcoxon test, twosided, 𝑝 = 0.111). Thus, the results are qualitatively,
but not significantly in line with the theoretical
prediction (i.e., subjects in the review treatment earn
more than in the trigger treatment).
We ran two linear mixed regression models on the
subjects’ overall payoffs in the game to disentangle the
influencing factors (see Table 5). In the first regression
(the “Treatment effect” column), we evaluate the
treatment with regard to the observed payoffs and find
that the trigger treatment has a weakly significant
negative effect. Taking the non-parametric analysis and
the regression analysis into consideration, we find that
the treatment effects on efficiency is almost significant.
Table 5. Regr. analysis for payoff differences
to average payoff when always honest
Treatment Effect
Impact of honesty
# of lies
--22.43 (2.082)**
Dummy
-27.97 (16.93)* -58.81 (13.62)**
Trigger
Intercept
-24.41 (14.22)* 43.34
(11.40)**
N
96
96
AIC
1155.5
1083.4
BIC
1165.7
1096.2
Log likel. -573.7
-536.7
Notes: The significance levels of the observed
coefficients are: ** 𝑝 < 0.001 and * 𝑝 < 0.1. No star
indicates significance levels 𝑝 > 0.1. Log-likelihood
statistic: 74.044 (p-value: < 0.001)

Our second regression (the “Impact of honesty”
column) adds the number of lies per subject to the
former regression model. The trigger dummy now turns
highly significant, indicating a clear efficiency gain in
the review treatment relative to the trigger treatment.
However, the higher frequency of lying in the review
treatment compensates for part of this efficiency gain.

6. Discussion
We present two treatments that compare the review
and trigger strategies in a supply chain experiment. Both

strategies are designed such that they support the truthtelling equilibrium. However, we find a significant
degree of lying under both strategies.
While we observe higher than theoretically
predicted truthfulness and efficiency in cheap talk
experiments (see [21, 22]), we observe that repeated
game strategies’ level of efficiency is worse than
predicted. Our results thus indicate that the efficiency
gap between cheap talk settings and repeated game
strategies, which normative analysis predict, is
overstated. An interesting avenue for future research is
a direct comparison between cheap talk as an efficiency
enhancer and repeated game strategies. Further, this
result highlights that a company would suffer from
allowing managers to communicate the forecast, instead
of automatically transmitting them to their supply chain
partners if they face an optimally designed repeated
game strategy.
A comparison of two frequently discussed
competing repeated game strategies shows that review
strategies’ higher complexity does not automatically
lead to higher efficiency. As theoretically predicted, we
do observe fewer punishment phases in the review
strategy than in the trigger strategy if we fix the degree
of lying. However, buyers exhibit a significantly higher
tendency to lie when confronted with a review strategy,
which diminishes the favorable effect of less
punishment.
Our experiments are not designed to test the
behavioral phenomena underlying this observation. We
conjecture that review strategies’ higher complexity
makes it harder for subjects to identify truth-telling as
the profit maximizing behavior. This is in line with
experimental work (e.g., [8, 18]) showing that human
participants find it difficult to apply backward-induction
for more than two periods.
Another explanation for our observation that buyers
lie more frequently in a review strategy than in a trigger
strategy may be that the consequence of lying is harsher
in the latter. Thus, increasing the burden of lying in the
review strategy might improve the benefit of a
theoretically better review strategy. Thus, further
research should test whether our results are sensitive to
parameter variations. However, once there is a
practically relevant upper bound for critical parameters,
such as the length of the punishment phase, or the
discount factor, our results indicate that review
strategies are not a better choice for all supply chain
interactions.
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